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Generally, Democrats do not increase military spending, and Re-
publicans do not raise welfare payments. Mostly, ruling politicians
stick to the manifesto of their party.
The current paper provides a theoretical explanation for this phe-
nomenon that does not assume politicians or voters to be ideologists.
I explore an environment where both voters and politicians always
prefer the policy that is adequate to the world state but contradicts
the party manifesto over the policy that is in line with the manifesto
but not adequate. I find that nevertheless, the inefficient manifesto-
driven policy will often result from their interaction.
Besides, I show that a high degree of agreement between the
politician in office, his party basis and the voter makes efficient, in-
formed policy rare or even impossible. But if homogeneity of con-
victions within parties is high, swing voter behavior can solve the
problem.
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1 Introduction
Democrats do generally not increase military spending, and Republicans
do generally not raise welfare payments. In the contrary, the ruling politi-
cian, i.e. the president, predominantly keeps at his party’s manifesto. As
Hetherington (2001) shows, the ideological distance between the Demo-
cratic and Republican party has even steadily increased since the 95th
Congress in the late seventies. In general, ideology has a considerable im-
pact on policy even if official “party discipline” is not part of the political
system. As Klingemann et al. (1994) show, policy implementations that
run contrary to the party doctrine are very seldom both in the U.S. and in
Europe.
It is doubtful whether this manifesto-driven way of making policy is
efficient. Intuitively, one should suppose that in a complex world of chang-
ing circumstances, the policy that is optimal at a time need not necessarily
be in line with the manifesto of the ruling party. Why, then, is manifesto-
driven policy such prevalent in both the U.S. and European countries?
One possible explanation would of course be that either politicians or
voters or even both just prefer manifesto-driven policy over any policy that
runs contrary to the party manifesto. Put differently, it is possible that the
agents involved into the political game are ideologists.
In one way or the other, this assumption has so far dominated the lit-
erature in political economics. Unfortunately, there is no direct empirical
evidence for this assumption. Its only legitimacy consists therefore in the
(admittedly rather strong) intuition that there is simply no other convinc-
ing explanation of the persistence of ideology.
But contrary to intuition, this explanation is difficult to accept for a
political economist. It is the received opinion among political economists
that at least in modern democracies, the median voter has no ideologi-
cal or only moderately ideological preferences. Thus, the prevalence of
manifesto-driven policies cannot be explained away as a submission of the
ruling party to the electorate. Instead, one has to assume that the prefer-
ences of party politicians and the pivotal voter are widely different: Party
politicians are ideologists, the median voter is not, and the parties submit
only imperfectly to the median voter.
Although this is a standard setup of political economics, it has its prob-
lems. Every model in which the preferences of the principal and the agents
differ widely is only as plausible as the assumption that the principal is un-
able to (costlessly) find an agent whose preferences are sufficiently aligned
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with his own.
In many cases, this assumption might be easy to justify. But with re-
gard to the standard setup in political economics, it is hard to see why
of all voters only the ideologists (the “extreme” leftists and the “extreme”
rightists) should be able to delegate their interests to political parties. It
should be equally likely that a pragmatic party whose preferences are
more aligned with those of the median voter establishes itself, especially
because it would win elections with certainty.
For these reasons, it would be good to have a model that explains ide-
ological equilibrium behavior of politicians without assuming them to be,
contrary to the pivotal voter, ideologists. In the current paper, I construct
such a model. I show that ideology may be the outcome of the political process
itself, although no ideologists are involved in it.
Consider the following world. There are leftists and rightists. Leftists
earn more from a welfare-maximizing leftist policy than from a welfare-
maximizing rightist policy. The opposite is true of the rightists. The presi-
dent gets an imperfect signal about whether the leftist or the rightist policy
is welfare-maximizing. If reelection incentives are unaffected, both leftist
and rightist presidents prefer following their signal over a blind implementa-
tion of their favorite policy. Thus, there are no ideologists. Besides, if the
policy choice of the president does not transmit new information about his
type (i.e. whether he is more of a leftist or more of a rightist), reelection
incentives will be unaffected by his policy choice.
One would suppose that in such a world, the president always follows
his signal in equilibrium. Intuitively, ideological shirking but not informed
policy could signal something about the true type of the president. There-
fore, in the non-ideological world considered the president seems to have
no incentive to shirk ideologically.
The current paper shows that this intuition might be wrong. The reason
is that under plausible assumptions, not ideological shirking but informed
policy transmits new information about the true type of the president.
This happens when leftist presidents are better in detecting the state of
the world in which a leftist policy would be welfare-maximizing, whereas
rightist presidents are better in detecting the state of the world in which a
rightist policy would be welfare-maximizing.
This assumption, however, is plausible enough. Rightists might have
different (biased) information sources than leftists;1 or leftists and rightists
1If rightists and leftists prefer different television channels and read different newspa-
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differ with regard to the economic theories they like, being more familiar
with their favorite theories than with alternative ones.
The tension between ideological and optimal policy in a world with
ideologists has already been studied in the literature. Especially the stream
of literature that started with Cukierman’s and Tommasi’s 1998 paper on
so-called “policy reversals” is concerned with the question under which
conditions the (ideological) politician in office will act according to his
signal rather than according to the manifesto of his party.2
Cowen and Sutter (1998) present similar ideas to the ones put forward
by Cukierman and Tommasi (1998). They conclude that policy reversals
do indeed occur whenever the incentive to signal the lack of ideological
shirking is strong enough. Naturally, if the policy proposal is opposed
to the party ideology, it is more easily believed to be rather information-
based instead of ideology-based than if it was in accordance with the party
ideology.
By contrast, I explore an environment where no politician would ever
want to exhibit ideological shirking. In this environment, politicians are
not tempted by ideological preferences to shirk the implementation of ad-
equate policies. However, they will often behave in equilibrium as if they
were.
Technically, my paper is related to a second stream of literature in
political economics that started with Harrington (1993). There, as well as
in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Chiu (2002), Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003),
Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Frisell (2005), politicians discard their own
signals in order to act according to the public opinion about the state of
the world. The prior of the principal, who in most of the above-mentioned
papers is identical with the pivotal voter, predominates the private signal
of the agent. Although my model is completely different from theirs, my
results, like theirs, are driven by effects of a combined reputation and
commitment problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I
present the model. I derive some fundamental results in section 3. Sec-
tion 4 characterizes the set of refined perfect Bayesian equilibria in pure
pers, the so-called media bias (consisting in a selective choice of information by the media)
would suffice to induce an asymmetry in the signal technology of leftists and rightists. The
media bias has been analyzed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006).
2The technical correctness of their paper is contested, though. Cukierman and Menirav
(2004) give some corrections of the original paper, but Dalen et al. (2005) argue that the
representation of the preferences in both above-mentioned papers is flawed.
4
strategies for the case where the majority of the incumbent party and the
representative voter are of the same political type. Section 5 presents the
case where the majority of the incumbent party is of a different political
type than the voter. In section 6, I extend the model. Section 7 discusses the
model and concludes. Most proofs and the definition of the equilibrium
refinement are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two parties, one left wing party pI and one right wing party
pC, and the representative voter V. Each party has a leader that is ran-
domly drawn from among its members, I for the leftist party and C for
the rightist party. Either I or C is the incumbent president, his party being
the incumbent party. The model comprises two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}.
There can be two state of the worlds w, drawn by nature with equal
probability at the beginning of each period: w = l or w = r. Two different
kinds of policy P are possible in each period, a left wing policy PL and a
right wing policy PR. The policy P either matches the state of the world
or fails to do so. P matches the state of the world if and only if its imple-
mentation increases welfare. Policies that match the state of the world will
therefore be called successful policies. The left wing policy PL is successful
if and only if w = l, and the right wing policy PR is successful if and only
if w = r.
The intuition behind this assumption is as follows. An economic policy
tends to be more confirmed by one economic theory than by some other.
Now economic theories can usually be distinguished into those that are
more favored by leftists and those that are more favored by rightists. For
example, leftists are more likely to rely on Keynesian theories than right-
ists; and rightists are more likely to believe in the so-called neoclassical
theories.
Because different economic theories describe reality differently, a given
state of the world is usually not described equally well by all of them. Thus,
most times there will be one theory, more likely to be favored by leftists or
by rightists, that does best at least temporarily.
2.1 Political types
There are two different types, leftists and rightists. Any individual i is
either a leftist or a rightist, Ti ∈ {L, R}. Shortly, the formal definitions of
5
political types are as follows:
Leftists Let individual i be of type L (a leftist). Then, her immediate
payoffs from possible policies P ∈ {PL, PR} would be:




, UL (PL | w = r) = 0
UL (PR | w = r) = (1− x), UL (PR | w = l) = 0
Besides, if i gets a signal on the state of the world, there will be the
following asymmetry in the signal qualities, depending on the state of the
world:





Rightists Let individual i be of type R (a rightist). Then, her immediate
payoffs from possible policies P ∈ {PL, PR} would be:




, UR (PR | w = l) = 0
UR (PL | w = l) = (1− x), UR (PL | w = r) = 0
Besides, if i gets a signal on the state of the world, there will be the
following asymmetry in the signal qualities, depending on the state of the
world:





Legacy Motive For simplicity, I add the assumption that the politicians
I and C care only for policies implemented by themselves and have zero
utility from policies that are the work of others. Analogously, party mem-
bers care only for policies shaped by their own parties. With regard to
presidents, this assumption has been already employed by Maskin and Ti-
role (2004) who call this kind of policy motivation a “legacy motive”; and
it has also been adopted by Frisell (2005). I could give up this assump-
tion without changing the qualitative results. (I give the reasons for this
in the Conclusion of this paper.) The voter cares about any policy that is
implemented.
In ordinary language, the concepts “leftist” and “rightist” have com-
plex meanings. On the one hand, being a leftist or a rightist means believ-
ing in some ideas, theories or information sources more than in others.
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On the other hand, it means to have interests and preferences, especially
with regard to the distribution of income in the economy, that may differ
sharply from those of people with the opposite political opinions. Both
meanings are accounted for in the model.
Leftists and rightists differ in the way in which they might get or in-
terpret information about the state of the world. The leftist is better able
to find out that w = l and less likely to find out that w = r. Exactly the
opposite is true for the rightist.
Distributional interests also differ across political types. A leftist prefers
a successful leftist policy {P, w} = {PL, l} over a successful rightist policy
{P, w} = {PR, r}, because he wants to get the higher income x. A right-
ist, by contrast, prefers a successful rightist policy over a successful leftist
policy for exactly the same reason.
Both leftists and rightists, however, agree in strictly preferring success-
ful policies over unsuccessful ones:
{{PL, l}, {PR, r}} L,R {{PL, r}, {PR, l}}.
This assumption captures the idea that politicians are not ideologists. They
are rather pragmatically interested in solving the problems of the day.
Therefore, this assumption contributes to the strength of the argument
presented in this paper: It will be shown that even though there may not
be any ideologists involved in the political process, its outcome will often
be thus as would be produced by hard-core ideologists.
2.2 Parties
Neither party is completely homogeneous with regard to the political opin-
ions of its members. Even in a left wing party, there will always be politi-
cians that on a given issue agree more with the majority of right wing
party members than their own party fellows. The analogous claim could
be made about any right wing party.2 To the best of my knowledge, the po-
litical heterogeneity within parties has so far been ignored in the economic
literature on reelection incentives. In the current model, it is accounted for.
2For empirical evidence on factionalism (i.e. political diversity) within parties, see Reiter
(2004). Strong factionalism can be explained in several ways. Firstly, there are other than
political reasons for an individual’s decision to join a party, like network considerations
and career concerns. Secondly, political opinions as well as payoffs might change over time
whereas the decision to enter a specific party, if it has been made early in life, cannot be
reversed without costs in terms of career options.
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Formally, a population of politicians of mass one sorts into the two
parties as follows. There are α ∈ (0, 1) leftists. A share τ > 12 of them
enters the leftist party pI , whereas the remaining share (1− τ) enters the
rightist party pC. Analogously, a share τ of the (1− α) rightists enters the
right wing party, whereas a share (1− τ) of them becomes part of the left
wing party.




ατ + (1− α) (1− τ) (1)




α (1− τ) + (1− α) τ (2)
Political preferences of politicians are private information, but the dis-
tributions of leftists and rightists in either party are common knowledge.
For simplicity, I assume that the representative voter’s political type
is commonly and perfectly known. Alternatively, one could suppose that
opinion polls lead to a noisy but informative signal about the voter’s type.
But this assumption would only make the model more complicated with-
out contributing much to the general idea.
2.3 Time structure and action space
At the beginning of the first period, nature draws the state of the world
w ∈ {l, r}. Each happens with probability 12 . The incumbent president j
receives a private signal sj0 on the state of the world, while his party basis
and the voter stay uniformed. Then, j has to decide which kind of policy –
PL or PR – he wants to implement.
First-period utilities are realized. Afterwards, j’s party basis decides
whether or not to confirm him in his office. I assume that this decision
will be in line with the majority preferences of the party members.
If the incumbent president is confirmed by his party, he will become
the party’s candidate for elections, K = j. If he is not confirmed, a ran-
domly drawn challenger N from his own party becomes the party’s candi-









Elections take place at the end of the first period. Then, the voter V
decides whether or nor to reelect the incumbent party. Depending on the
voter’s decision, the new president in the second period is either K ∈
{j, N} or the leader of the challenging party pi, with i 6= j, i ∈ {I, C}.
At the beginning of the second period, the state of the world w is drawn
again. The elected president k receives a signal sk1. Then, he implements a


















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Timing of events and decisions
2.4 Utilities and motivations
Politicians act according to their policy motivation and their office moti-
vation. The office motivation is due to an ego rent E that the politician in
office gets from being in power. The members of his party get an ego rent
e from belonging to the ruling party.
The policy motivation is supposed to be a dominant interest in success-






















PR | sj2 = r̂
)
represents the expected utility of in-
dividual i, being of the leftist type L, from payoffs in period t, if in t the
president j has got the signal sjt telling him that PR would match the state
of the world, and if the president accounts for this signal by implementing
PR. The other expressions in the above inequalities can be understood in
similar ways.
For i = j, it follows from (3) and (4) that the president prefers acting
according to his signal at any rate at least as long as the two possible
policies PL and PR do not differ with respect to any reelection probabili-
ties eventually associated with them. Thus, (3) and (4) also implement the
assumption, meant to strengthen the argument, that politicians are not ide-
ologists. Consider for example a president of the leftist type who receives
a signal informing him that the state of the world is r. This president will
be better off implementing PR and earning (1− x) at best than gambling
on the chance that the signal might be wrong, although PL, in case of
unexpected success, would give him x.
The condition that guarantees this relative importance of the signal for
the president is easy to deduce. Suppose that the president j implements
a policy that runs contrary to his own political type (PR if he is a leftist or
PL if he is a rightist) but that is in line with his signal s
j
t. His immediate
expected utility from the present period’s outcome of his policy choice is
EU jtsig =
σL
σL + (1− σH)
(1− x) + E. (5)
Suppose now, by contrast, that the president j discards his signal sjt
in favor of the policy that suits his own political type (PL if he is a leftist
or PR if he is a rightist). His immediate expected utility from the present
period’s outcome of his policy choice is now
EU jtnosig =
(1− σH)
σL + (1− σH)
x + E (6)
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It follows from the preference assumptions (3) and (4), that the left
hand side in (5) is larger than the left hand side in (6). Thus, applying (3)






Assumption 1 can easily be understood to be a strong-signalling as-
sumption: The signal qualities are high, that is to say σH and σL are large
enough for the signal to be relied on with comparative ease, and the dif-
ference in the payoffs from successful left and right wing policies is com-
paratively low.
Intuitively, such a condition should guarantee that, as stated in (3)
and (4), all individuals and not only the president would prefer the in-
formed policy over the high-income policy. In fact, Assumption 1 is pow-
erful enough to do the work:
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the voter prefers the
informed policy. Presidents and party members prefer the informed policy
if the reelection probability is unaffected.
Proof See Appendix.
In the following four sections, the model will be solved. Obviously, it
is to be solved backwards. The equilibrium concept applying here is a
refined concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The refinement is given
in the Appendix.
3 The second period
The first question is how the politician who wins elections at the beginning
of the second period will act. The answer that is stated in Lemma 2 below
is intuitive. In the second period, office motivation plays no role. Therefore,
the considerable weight that the president gives to his information about
the state of the world will fully bear on his decision.
Lemma 2 Any president in the second period will choose policy ac-
cording to his signal, even if the signal favors the policy that runs contrary
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to his political type. This decision will be ex ante efficient, optimal not only
from his own perspective and the perspective of all other members of the
two parties, but also from the point of view of the voter.
Proof Lemma 2 is directly implied by Lemma 1.
Of course, such last period effects are very seldom in reality.3 But
Lemma 2 should be seen as adding to the strength of argument. The
current model is designed to show that manifesto-driven, inefficient pol-
icy can be the equilibrium outcome even in a world without ideologists.
With the help of Lemma 2, it can be shown that even if both the voter
and the politicians expected the president to behave efficiently and non-
ideologically in the future, and rightly so, it could nevertheless be impos-
sible to implement efficient behavior in the present.
The next question is what the voter will do during elections, knowing
that in the second period the elected president will efficiently act in line
with his signal. According to Lemma 1, the only interest of the voter is
that the policy implemented should be successful. If the signal technology
were independent of the president’s political type, so that in the second
period all politicians, once in office, acted alike in expectations, the voter
would be indifferent between all possible candidates I, N and C. For the
case of indifference, I assume that the voter reelects the incumbent party.
But the signal technology depends on the type of the president. A
president whose type differs from the voter’s type would be worse in
identifying successful policies that give the voter x than in identifying
successful policies that give the voter only (1− x). This is because such a
president would be more likely to detect the state of the world that suits
his own type, but not the voter’s type. This characteristic is implied by the
definitions of political types. What follows is
Lemma 3 At the beginning of the second period, the voter will al-
ways elect the candidate whose probability of sharing the voter’s political
type is highest.
Proof See Appendix.
In the remaining part of the paper, I will discuss two different cases
in succession. In the first case, both the voter and the majority of the in-
cumbent party are of the leftist type, so that there is political agreement
3I thank Astrid Matthey for pressing this point.
12
between them. In the second case, the voter is still a leftist, but the major-
ity of the incumbent party consists of rightists, so that a gulf of political
disagreement separates the voter from this majority. The first case will be
called the case of political harmonism; and the second case will be referred
to as the case of political disharmonism. All results will also apply if types
are reversed.
4 Equilibria under political harmonism
In the case of political harmonism, both the voter and the majority of the in-
cumbent party are leftists. Thus, as Lemma 3 predicts, the candidate with
the highest probability of being a leftist will be elected at the beginning of
the second period.
Suppose that in the first period, the incumbent president I acts accord-
ing to his signal sI0. Thus, if s
I
0 = l̂, he implements PL; and if s
I
0 = r̂, he
implements PR. It follows from the definition of political types than if I is
a true leftist, he will be more likely to get the signal sI0 = l̂. If, however, he
is a rightist in his heart, the signal will be more likely to be sI0 = r̂.
Accordingly, if I implements PR, he will become less likely in the eyes
of others, who update their beliefs according to Bayes rule, to be a true left-
ist. In contrast, after having chosen the left wing policy PL, his conditional
probability of being a leftist will increase.
In order to express this formally, define
Pr{T I = L | w = l ∧ P = PL} ≡ π ILSL
Pr{T I = L | w = r ∧ P = PL} ≡ π ILUL
Pr{T I = L | w = r ∧ P = PR} ≡ π ILSR
Pr{T I = L | w = l ∧ P = PR} ≡ π ILUR
Consider now a successful leftist policy choice. After this, the president
is a leftist in the eyes of the others with posterior probability
π ILSL =
ατσH
ατσH + (1− α) (1− τ) σL
(7)
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If the leftist policy choice has been unsuccessful, the president is taken
to be leftist with posterior probability
π ILUL =
ατ (1− σL)
ατ (1− σL) + (1− α) (1− τ) (1− σH)
(8)
Because 12 < σL < σH < 1, equations (7) and (8), together with (1),
imply that
π I1L > π
I0
L , if π
I1
L ∈ {π ILSL, π ILUL}. (9)
Thus, implementing PL always makes the president more likely in the
eyes of others to be a leftist.
The way of showing that implementing PR makes him less so is very
similar. Consider first the successful implementation of PR. After this the
president is a leftist with posterior probability
π ILSR =
ατσL
ατσL + (1− α) (1− τ) σH
(10)
After unsuccessful PR, his posterior probability of being a leftist is
π ILUR =
ατ (1− σH)
ατ (1− σH) + (1− α) (1− τ) (1− σL)
(11)
It is easy to see from (10), (11) and (2), that because 12 < σL < σH < 1,
π I1L < π
I0
L , if π
I1
L ∈ {π ILSR, π ILUR}.
Suppose now for the moment that there is a policy outcome {P, w}
after that the president I is believed to be less likely to be a leftist than even
C, the leader of the right wing party. This assumption is compatible with
informed policy and Bayesian updating only if {P, w} ∈ {{PR, r}, {PR, l}}.
That becomes clear from comparing the prior probability that C is a leftist,




, with all four possible values of π I1L . Thus, it
is the successful or unsuccessful rightist policy choice that, as shall be
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supposed temporarily, makes the president I seem even less likely to be
leftist than his challenger C.
In such a case, Lemma 3 implies that after the outcome {P, w} the voter
will prefer C over I. If I chooses PR, he therefore risks his office rent, even
if his party confirms him in his office.
He risks nothing, however, if he chooses PL. Firstly, Lemma 3 and (9)
imply that after any outcome of an informed leftist policy choice, the voter
will prefer I over C. Secondly, the leftist majority of the left wing party
prefers the candidate most likely to be a leftist to rule in the second period.
This follows from the definition of political types. The proof is exactly on
the lines of the proof of Lemma 3 and shall therefore be skipped. What
follows from this consideration and equation (9) is that I’s party fellows
will prefer I over any N, whenever I implements PL.
Consequently, the president’s office motivation runs contrary to his
deep interest into informed policy whenever his signal is r̂.
But suppose now, by contrast, that the incumbent president I is always
more likely to be a true leftist than the leader C of the right wing party.
Put differently, even if I implements PR, he is still taken to be less likely to
be a rightist than C. Formally,
π I1L > π
C0
L ∀π I1L ∈ {π ILSL, π ILUL, π ILSR, π ILUR}.
Here Lemma 3 implies that the voter at the beginning of the second
period will prefer I over C in the presidential office regardless of I’s policy
choice in the first period.
Intuitively, one should suspect that in this case, informed policy would
be riskless for the president in the first period, and that office motivation
could never interfere with it.
However, the contrary is true. In order to see that, suppose the presi-
dent to follow his signal in choosing PR. Although he has nothing to fear
from the voter now, he is endangered by his own party. His probability of
being a leftist decreases in the eyes of his party fellows. In their opinion, he
is now less likely to be a leftist than any newcomer N from among them.





Again, the leftist majority of the left wing party prefers the candidate
who is most likely to be a leftist to rule in the second period. Thus, after a
rightist policy choice made by I, the leftist party fellows of I prefer any N
from their party over I. Thus, after an informed, even successful, rightist
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policy choice, the incumbent president will be replaced in his office by a
newcomer from his own party.
It may be helpful to realize that under political harmonism, the party
basis and not the voter is the major principal whom the incumbent pres-
ident has to confront. The president will be disposed of by the majority
of his own party fellows if he follows his signal in implementing PR. This
will occur even if the incumbent president would be a winning candidate
in elections. And it will occur although everybody, including the presi-
dent’s party fellows, wants him to follow his signal and to implement PR
whenever necessary. Thus, although there are no ideologists, leftists want a
leftist president. This is because leftists want someone for president who is
as likely as possible to detect the state of the world l whenever it happens
to prevail.
The equilibria existing under harmonism are all driven by this mecha-
nism. Intuitively, equilibrium behavior should depend on the relative im-
portance of the president’s office motivation. As characterized below, there
are at most four different equilibria, three of them being plausible, depend-
ing on the exact amount of the presidential office rent.
Define the ego rents
EL ≡
σL
σL + (1− σH)
− x− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] ,
EH ≡ x−
(1− σL)
σH + (1− σL)
− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)]
Theorem Suppose EL < EH. Then, there exist the following four
pure strategy equilibria under political harmonism: (1) For E < EL, there
exists a pooling equilibrium. The incumbent president chooses the in-
formed policy regardless of his type in the first period. (2) For EL < E <
EH, there exists a separating equilibrium. If the incumbent president is
a rightist, he chooses the informed policy in the first period; otherwise
he implements PL regardless of his signal. (3) For E > EH, there exist
two pooling equilibria. (3a) In the first pooling equilibrium, the incumbent
president implements PL in the first period, regardless of his signal. (3b) In
the second pooling equilibrium, the incumbent president implements PR
in the first period, regardless of his signal. But this pooling equilibrium is
implausible.
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These equilibria will be represented separately and in more detail in
Propositions 1–3 and Corollary 2 below. Accordingly, I discuss and prove
them sequentially.
4.1 Equilibrium with low office motivation
Proposition 1 (i) For E < EL, there exists a pooling equilibrium. The
incumbent president chooses the informed policy regardless of his type in
the first period. (ii) If and only if he implements PL, he will become his
party’s appointed candidate for elections. Then, the incumbent party will
be reelected. (iii) This equilibrium is first best.
Proof See Appendix.
Obviously, for any E > EL, this efficient pooling equilibrium breaks
down, because the costs which the incumbent politician has to bear when
he renounces his office in order to implement PR are growing to high.
4.2 Equilibrium with moderate office motivation
Intuitively, it is the leftist president who first gets an incentive to deviate
from equilibrium, because anyway, he does not like PR as much as PL. The
leftist president then starts to act according to the manifesto of his party.
Proposition 2 (i) For EL < E < EH, there exists a separating equi-
librium. If the incumbent president is a rightist, he chooses the informed
policy in the first period; otherwise he implements PL regardless of his
signal. (ii) If and only if he implements PL, he will become his party’s
appointed candidate for elections. Then, the incumbent party will be re-
elected. (iii) This equilibrium is inefficient, because the leftist president
discards his signal.
Proof See Appendix.
Obviously, the separating equilibrium characterized above does only
exist if EL < EH. In fact, this condition does not hold necessarily. The
intuitive reason is as follows. Suppose the president is a leftist and gets
the signal sIt = r̂. Then, he acknowledges that if even he, as a leftist, gets
a signal that the rightist policy would be appropriate, this signal must be
very reliable. Precisely because leftists are less likely to get the signal r̂,
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they rely more on it than rightists.4 Thus, although leftists loose more in
following the signal r̂ than rightists if this signal is wrong, the signal r̂ is
less likely to be wrong if received by a leftist. It is not clear beforehand
which of the two effects dominates. Therefore, EL might be smaller but
also larger than EH.
In the following, it shall be assumed that EL < EH, so that the separat-
ing equilibrium characterized above exists.
Assumption 2 EL < EH.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition
2 is the unique (refined) perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium in pure
strategies.
As Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 show, an ego rent from power that
is higher than EL is compatible with the efficient policy choice only if by
chance, the ruling leader of the left wing incumbent party is a rightist. But
also this possibility of efficient, informed policy breaks down, if the ego
rent from power becomes even higher.
4.3 Equilibrium with high office motivation
Intuitively, if the office motivation of the incumbent president is strong
enough, not even successfully implementing the favorite policy will be
worth the loss of the office. Thus, with strong office motivation, both polit-
ical types of president discard their signal and act according to the party
manifesto.
Proposition 3 (i) For E > EH, there exists a pooling equilibrium.
Both types of incumbent president implement PL in the first period, regard-
less of their signal. (ii) If and only if the incumbent president implements
PL, he will become his party’s appointed candidate for elections. Then,
the incumbent party will be reelected. (iii) This equilibrium is inefficient
because both types discard their signal.
Proof See Appendix.
4This inverse correlation between frequency and weight of a signal is at the core of the
arguments used to explain policy reversals in Cowen and Sutter (1998) and Cukierman
and Tommasi (1998).
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Intuitively, this pooling equilibrium is plausible. Because the party ba-
sis prefers a leftist for president in the second period, both types of presi-
dent always implement the leftist policy. If the president chose to deviate
and to implement PR, he would become more likely to be a rightist in the
eyes of his party. This off-equilibrium belief which sustains the equilibrium
is plausible: Even if the deviating president believes to be confirmed in his
office against equilibrium-expectations, PR will lead to a higher expected
payoff for him than PL only if he has got the signal r̂. This signal, however,
is more likely to be received by a rightist.
However, among the Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game there is
another, thoroughly implausible, equilibrium in which both types pool on
PR.
Corollary 2 (i) For E > EH, there exists a second pooling equilib-
rium. Both types of incumbent president implement PR in the first period,
regardless of their signal. (ii) If and only if the incumbent president im-
plements PR, he will become his party’s appointed candidate for elections.
Then, the incumbent party will be reelected. (iii) This equilibrium is ineffi-
cient because both types discard their signal.
Proof Suppose that the party members have the following off-equi-
librium belief: If the president implements PL, he is more likely to be a
rightist than any newcomer from among the members of the left wing
party. Then, the proof of Corollary 2 is on the lines of the proof provided
for Proposition 3 in the Appendix; only indices change. Therefore, the
proof shall be skipped here.
The off-equilibrium belief that sustains this pooling equilibrium is im-
plausible. To see this, remember that if there were no reelection incentives,
every type of president would always follow his signal. Consequently, the
president should never deviate from implementing PR unless he would
have got the signal l̂. But if he has got the signal l̂, he must be more likely
to be a leftist in the eyes of anybody who updates her beliefs according
to Bayes Rule. Thus, it is not rational to believe that a president who had
deviated from the supposed equilibrium and had implemented PL would
have become more likely to be a rightist.
Unfortunately, this kind of argument is not captured by standard re-
finements of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, I define a refinement
which is in the spirit of Farrell’s neologism-proofness (but cannot be re-
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duced to any straightforward generalization of it). I call this refinement
deviation-rationalization-proofness and relegate it to the Appendix.
The equilibrium described in Corollary 1 is not deviation-rationaliza-
tion-proof and can therefore be excluded from the set of admissible equi-
libria.
Corollary 3 The two pooling equilibria that are characterized in
Propositions 1 and 3 are the unique deviation-rationalization-proof pool-
ing equilibria in pure strategies.
Proof See Appendix.
In the present section, it has been shown that under political harmonism,
when the voter is of the same type as most members of the incumbent
party, the president might discard his signal in equilibrium. Although
there are no ideologists involved in the political process, manifesto-driven
policy will be the only equilibrium outcome if the presidential office rent
is only large enough.
One remark about this equilibrium restriction on the office rent is ap-
propriate now. The limiting rents EL and EH are both not necessarily larger
than zero. They can even both be negative. Thus, even a president who is
rather ashamed of his profession could exhibit the equilibrium behavior
described in Proposition 3.
The reason is as follows. If the incumbent president is reelected, he
can, trivially, be sure that someone of his one political type – namely he
himself – will rule in the second period. However, he cannot be sure of
this if someone else will become president.
Even without the assumption of the legacy motive, the incumbent pres-
ident would always prefer the candidate with the highest probability of be-
ing of the same type as he himself to rule in the second period: He wants
the candidate to rule who is most likely to detect the state of the world
that promises the high payoff x to him. Thus, for this reason alone the
incumbent president wants to be reelected, even if his ego rent from being
president is zero or even negative. I summarize this in the
Remark All the equilibria characterized above allow for non-posi-
tive ego rents E.
In the next section, the case of political disharmonism will be discussed.
I will show that for a certain parameter space, the situation will eventually
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be improved if the voter and the majority of the ruling party are of differ-
ent types.
5 Equilibria under political disharmonism
Suppose still the voter to be a leftist, whereas the incumbent party is now
the right wing party. What this assumption changes is the following: Now,
the incumbent president is C, and I is the challenger. Both C and his party
anticipate that at the beginning of the second period, the voter will elect
the candidate with the lowest probability of being a rightist, or, alternatively,
with the highest probability of being a leftist. Thus, because πC0L < π
I0
L , the
rightist party has no chance to be reelected with a newcomer as candidate
for elections. Replacing C with a newcomer would result in zero utility for
the party members; and therefore, they will never have an incentive to do
so. But even the chance to be reelected with the incumbent president as
candidate for elections might not exist. There are two possible cases.
In the first case, the incumbent president C is very much more likely
ex ante to be a rightist than the challenger I. Then, whatever the policy
choice of C in the first period might be, his updated probability πCR of
being a rightist will be too high for him to be reelected by the voter. Thus,
because in this case πCR > (1− π I0L ) always holds, the rightist party will
never be reelected, and C will loose his office at any rate.
Consequently, in the case where πCR > (1− π I0L ) holds independently
of what the incumbent president C does, the situation in the first period
is exactly the same as if it were already the second period. Reelection in-
centives break down. The consequences are similar to the effects stated
in Lemma 2: Because office motivation plays no role at all, the incumbent
president C always acts according to his signal, making the efficient deci-
sion. This case shall be called efficient resignation.
There is also another conceivable possibility. It could be that the ex ante
probabilities of being a rightist of the two politicians I and C are not too
far away from each other. Consider now a supposed equilibrium in which
at least some information about the president’s type can be inferred from
his doing. Then, it could happen that after the successful or unsuccessful
implementation of one (but not the other) kind of policy, C will be deemed
less likely to be a rightist than his challenger I, so that πCR < (1− π I0L ).
Then, the party members know that depending on C’s policy choice,
their party can be reelected with C as a candidate for elections. If and
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only if the incumbent party is reelected, the party members will have pos-
itive utility.3 Therefore, the rightist party members appoint the incumbent
president whenever he has decided in a way so that πCR < (1− π I0L ). This
re-awakens office motivation and constitutes an incentive for the president
to choose the action that most likely decreases his probability of being a
rightist. This case shall be called contingent populism.
All existing equilibria belong either to the one or to the other case.
However, the case of contingent populism does not differ substantially
from the results under political harmonism. Contingent populism as well
as political harmonism result in office motivation having a say in the pres-
ident’s policy choice. As under political harmonism, efficient equilibria
under populism exist only for low values of E. They are characterized in
Propositions 4 and 5 below. First, define the following ego rents:











[σHx + σL (1− x)] ,
ECL(b)L ≡
σL
σL + (1− σH)
− x− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] ,
ECR(b)L ≡ x−
1− σL
σH + (1− σL)
− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] .
Proposition 4 For σHσL <
τ2
(1−τ)2





there exists a pooling equilibrium under political disharmonism and con-
tingent populism. The incumbent president C chooses the informed policy
in the first period, regardless of his type. He will be reelected if he im-
plements PL without success. But if he implements PR or successful PL, the
voter will elect I, and C will loose his office.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 5 For τ
2
(1−τ)2





exists another pooling equilibrium with informed policy under political
3This is due to the assumption of the legacy motive (politicians care only for the policy
that is implemented by themselves or their own party). But if I gave up this assumption,
there would still exist a parameter space in which the above considerations are true. For
more details see the discussion in the Conclusion of this paper.
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disharmonism and contingent populism. The incumbent president C chooses
the informed policy in the first period, regardless of his type. He will be
reelected if he implements PL, successful or not. But if he implements PR,
the voter will elect I, and C will loose his office.
Proof See Appendix.
Obviously, these equilibria break down whenever the ego rent of the
president becomes high enough for him to discard his signal in favor of
the populist policy PL. As under harmonism, I assume that a president of
the leftist type is the first to do so:







Accordingly, there exist two separating equilibria, corresponding to the
two efficient pooling equilibria described above. They are characterized in
Propositions 6 and 7 below.
Proposition 6 For 1σL <
τ2
(1−τ)2
< 1(1−σH) and E > E
CL(a)
L , there ex-
ists a separating equilibrium under political disharmonism and contingent
populism. If the incumbent president C is a rightist, he will choose the
informed policy; otherwise he will always implement PL. He will be re-
elected if he implements PL without success. But if he implements PR or
successful PL, the voter will elect I, and C will loose his office.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 7 For τ
2
(1−τ)2
< 1σL and E
CL(b)
L < E < E
CR(b)
L , there exists
another separating equilibrium under political disharmonism and contin-
gent populism. If the incumbent president C is a rightist, he will choose
the informed policy; otherwise he will always implement PL. He will be
reelected if he implements PL, successful or not. But if he implements PR,
the voter will elect I, and C will loose his office.
Proof See Appendix.
Corollary 4 In the case of political disharmonism, there is no pure-
strategy equilibrium in which both types of president pool on one of the
two policies PL, PR.
Proof Suppose both types pooled on P ∈ {PL, PR}. Then, the voter
would not update her belief about the president’s type. Consequently, she
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would never reelect the incumbent party. But then, both types of president
would want to deviate and act according to their signal.
Thus, contingent populism under political disharmonism differs from
political harmonism in that the rightist type of president chooses the in-
formed policy in all possible pure-strategy equilibria. Nevertheless, the
interesting, novel case is efficient resignation. Efficient resignation alone
does not include any incentive for any type of president to discard his sig-
nal. Thus, it is the leading question of this section which conditions make
this case prevail. The answer is given in
Proposition 8 In the case of political disharmonism, a leftist voter
is confronted with a rightist incumbent party, or vice versa. Then, there
exists a pooling equilibrium where both types of president choose the
informed policy in the first period. They become the appointed candidate
for elections, but without being elected by the voter. This equilibrium of





The requirement for this efficient pooling equilibrium differs from the
condition for the corresponding equilibrium under political harmonism.
There, the requirement that the office motivation be low, E < EL, is nec-
essary to sustain the equilibrium. Under political disharmonism, however,
a pooling equilibrium with informed policy can also be established if the
office motivation of the incumbent president is moderate, E < EL < EH,
or even high, E > EH.
What is needed then is only that within the two competing parties,
political agreement is strong: The number of party members who differ
from the majority must be low enough (τ must be high). Put differently,
the political opposition of the two competing parties must be fierce enough
in order to ensure that never the leader of the left wing party could be
thought of as being more likely to be a rightist in his heart than the leader
of the right wing party.
6 Extension: Electing the incumbent party
The question is now if the voter would be happier with or without efficient
resignation and political disharmonism. Put differently, would she prefer
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an incumbent party with a manifesto contrary to her own political type,
but the president always acting according to his signal? Or would she
prefer an incumbent party with a manifesto that suits her political type,
its leader always acting according to it and discarding his signal?
Intuitively, it is conceivable that the voter is happier without efficient res-
ignation and political disharmonism. The reason is that the efficient equilib-
rium under political disharmonism differs from the efficient equilibrium
under political harmonism. Under political disharmonism, the president
is less likely to be of the same political type as the voter. Therefore, the
president is less likely to detect the state of the world that would give
the voter the high payoff x in case of a successful policy. Thus, it is not
straightforward that the voter is apt to exchange inefficiency under politi-
cal harmonism for efficiency under political disharmonism.
In order to clarify this point, we extend the model by introducing elec-
tions at the beginning of the first period. Thus, the (leftist) voter has to elect
the incumbent party. Apart from this, the structure of the model remains
unchanged.
The voter knows the value of E and anticipates which of the three
possible pure strategy equilibria would be played if she elected the leftist
party at the beginning of the first period. She compares her expected utility
from this equilibrium with the utility she expects from efficient resignation
under political disharmonism. If and only if the latter expected utility is
larger, she will vote for the rightist party in the first period.
Proposition 9 Suppose that E > EL, τ
2
(1−τ)2
> 1−σL1−σH . The leftist voter
then prefers the rightist party to be the incumbent party, given that the
equilibrium with efficient, informed policy is played in the first period.5
Proof See Appendix.
The intuition is simple: When ego rents from power are high enough,
the incumbent party whose majority is of the voter’s political type would
indirectly force the incumbent president to discard his signal. He would
always act according to the party manifesto in order to keep his office.
If this did not take place, the voter would prefer the party whose ma-
jority is of her own type to be the ruling party. This would make it more
5Of course, an analogous result will be obtained if the model is calculated for a rightist
instead of a leftist voter. Then, the rightist voter would elect the leftist party for incumbent
if E > EL and τ
2
(1−τ)2
> 1−σL1−σH . Besides, if α was set to
1
2 , both versions of the model would
be technically identical.
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likely that the president, too, would be of her type. But she values success-
ful policy so much more than ideological compliance that she is willing to
accept a president whose type very probably differs from hers, if only he
acts according to his signal.
Therefore, the voter makes use of the first-period elections in order to
establish informed policy. Electing the rightist party for incumbent, the
voter demolishes office considerations by credibly committing herself not
to reelect the incumbent party at any rate. Thus, Proposition 9 gives a
rationale for swing voter behavior in societies without ideologists when ego
rents from power are high enough.
Obviously, the situation changes if ego rents are very low, E < EL.
Then, the efficient equilibrium is played even under harmonism; and the
voter need not make any sacrifice in order to get the informed policy to be
implemented always. The corresponding equilibrium is described in
Proposition 10 Suppose that E < EL, τ
2
(1−τ)2
> 1−σL1−σH . The leftist
voter would then prefers the leftist party to be the incumbent party.
Proof The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 2 and
shall therefore be skipped here.
To summarize, if the majority adhering to the party manifesto is large
enough in each party, i.e. if τ
2
(1−τ)2
> 1−σL1−σH , the efficient equilibrium with
informed policy will always be played in the extended model. Either ego
rents from presidential power are low, E < EL, and informed policy and
political harmonism – or partisanship – are compatible with each other.
Then, the voter always elects the candidate of the party whose majority is
of her own political type. Or ego rents are not so low, E > EL. Then, the
voter exhibits swing voter behavior in order to abolish office motivation, so
that the president is concerned with the success of his policy exclusively.
7 Conclusion
Politicians almost always act according to the manifesto of their party.
Thus, their policy exhibits an ideological bias. One manifest explanation of
this phenomenon would be that voters or politicians (or both) care more
for the ideological coloring of policies than for their success in terms of
welfare effects. But this explanation has its problems. First, political econo-
mists normally assume that the pivotal voter does not have any ideological
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preferences – mainly because they apply the median voter model or want
their results to be reproducible within the median voter model. Second,
the assumption that although the voter himself is not ideological, he is not
able to delegate the task of maximizing his welfare to a non-ideological
agent is far from being obvious.
In this paper, I give a different explanation for the observable ideo-
logical behavior of politicians. I show that even though politicians, party
members and the voter might initially prefer informed policies over ideo-
logical compliance, informed policies could be rare or even impossible.
The reason is the following. Political types – whether the politician is
a leftist or a rightist – influence how politicians get or interpret their infor-
mation. Therefore, a politician who implements an informed policy also
transmits at least some information about his political type. This affects his
reputation vis-a-vis his own party. Although the party basis wants the in-
cumbent politician to choose the informed policy, the party faces a serious
commitment problem. Preferring a leader of their own political type, the
majority of party members will replace the incumbent politician whenever
a newcomer from among them will guarantee equal reelection chances and
a higher probability of being of their type.
Ironically, the problem is constituted by too much political agreement
between the voter, the incumbent politician and the incumbent party. An-
ticipating that the voter will reelect the incumbent party, the party basis
wants to make as sure as possible that the ruling politician in the second
period is of the same type as they are. The incumbent president, on his
part, wants to make believe that he is their man in fact. Accordingly, the
incumbent politician chooses to implement the policy that is nearest to the
creed of the party, regardless of the welfare effects of his policy apart from
office rents.
If political diversity within parties is low, informed policies are never-
theless possible. The voter could then solve his commitment problem by
electing for the first period the party whose creed she dislikes. Then, the
voter succeeds in committing herself to not reelecting the incumbent party,
and the impact of office spoils vanishes from the stage of policy. Thus,
swing voter behavior could be an optimal reaction to the joined reputa-
tion and commitment problems that arise when ruling politicians depend
on the support of their parties.
Finally, some remarks on the robustness of these results to the abandon-
ment of the legacy motive are appropriate. The assumption of the legacy
motive says that presidents have positive (expected) utility only from their
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own policy implementations, not from policies implemented by their chal-
lengers, and that party members have positive (expected) utility only from
policies implemented by their own party leader, not from policies imple-
mented by the leader of the challenging party. This assumption has been
adopted solely for simplification. If I gave up this assumption, the qualita-
tive results would remain unaffected; only the parameter space in which
they are true would change.
The reasons for this robustness are the following. Consider first the
president and assume that the assumption of the legacy motive is not true,
i.e. the president has positive utility from any policy implemented by any-
one. What is affected by this abandonment of the legacy motive is the
president’s (expected) utility from the (future) policy choice in the second
period, because it is possible that in the second period, someone else will
be ruling instead of him. For all equilibrium results, only the expected util-
ity from the policy choice in period two is important. Even without the
legacy motive, the president’s expected utility from his own future policy
choice is necessarily higher then his expected utility from the future policy
choice of somebody else: His expected utility from a future policy choice
is strictly monotonously increasing in the probability that the individual
who makes this choice is of his own political type. If someone else will be
ruling in the second period, this probability will be less than one; it will be
one if the president himself will be ruling. The assumption of the legacy
motive enlarges this difference between the president’s expected utility
from his own future policy choice and his expected utility from the policy
choice of someone else. But the sign of this difference does not change.
Thus, if the assumption of the legacy motive is abandoned, the reelection
incentive of the president becomes weaker. It would suffice to increase the
president’s ego rent to compensate for that. Therefore, only the parameter
space in which the results hold will change; the results themselves will
remain unaffected.
Consider now the members of the incumbent party and assume again
that the assumption of the legacy motive is not true, i.e. the party mem-
bers have positive utility from any policy implemented by anyone. Again,
the abandonment of the assumption of the legacy motive affects their (ex-
pected) utility from the (future) policy choice in the second period. More
precisely, their (expected) utility from a policy implemented by the leader
of the challenging party becomes strictly positive. For the equilibrium re-
sults, the only important incentive of the party members is the incentive
of their majority replace the president by a newcomer after the implemen-
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tation of a policy that runs contrary to the party manifesto. Call this in-
centive the replacement incentive. The legacy motive does not affect the
replacement-incentive directly, because it does not affect the difference in
expected utilities from the policy choice of the incumbent president and a
newcomer from the same party.
But the legacy motive affects the replacement incentive indirectly, via
the reelection incentive. The majority of the incumbent party has a reelec-
tion incentive apart from their office rents even without the legacy motive.
The reason is that even without the legacy motive, the majority of the in-
cumbent party has a higher expected utility from a policy implemented
by a newcomer from among them than from a policy implemented by the
leader of the challenging party: Their expected utility from a future pol-
icy choice is strictly monotonously increasing in the probability that the
individual who makes this choice is of their own political type. This prob-
ability will be strictly higher if a newcomer from among them becomes
president than if the challenger does. The legacy motive increases the re-
election incentive, if the reelection chances are positively correlated with
replacement.
We have to consider three different cases here. In the first case, the
incumbent party knows that she will be reelected (not reelected) whether
or not she replaces the president. In these cases, the reelection incentive
plays no role, and the abandonment of the legacy motive does not change
anything. In the second case, the incumbent party knows that she will be
reelected only if she replaces the president after the implementation of a
policy that runs contrary to the party manifesto. Then, the abandonment
of the legacy motive decreases the replacement incentive via decreasing
the reelection incentive. One can compensate for this by increasing the
office rent of the party members. In the third case, the incumbent party
knows that she will be reelected only if she does not replace the president
after a choice of policy that runs contrary to the party manifesto. (This is
the case of contingent populism.) Abandoning the legacy motive has the
effect that the case of contingent populism exists only if the office rents of
the party members are high enough. Otherwise, only efficient resignation
would exist under political disharmonism.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 One part of Lemma 1 says that the president prefers
acting according to his signal as long as the two possible policies PL and
PR do not differ with respect to any reelection probabilities associated
with them. The proof of this statement is included in the deduction of
Assumption 1 and has already been given in the main part of the paper.
The remaining part of Lemma 1 says that the preferences of the politi-
cians outside the presidential office are, under the ceteris paribus condition
mentioned above, perfectly aligned with those of the president, whereas
the voter prefers the informed policy regardless of reelection probabilities.
This can be proved to be implied by Assumption 1 as follows.
Let dite be a dummy with dite = 1 if i is a member of the ruling party in t
and dite = 0 otherwise. If president j in period t acts according to his signal
sjt at any rate, the utility that a leftist individual i 6= j, Ti = L, expects from
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and A representing the set of information accessible to i about eventual
former policy choices made by j.
If, by contrast, the politician in office discards his signal and chooses
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Given that at the beginning of period t, i believes the politician j to be








































If π jtL was zero, this inequality would reduce to Assumption 1 and
therefore be true. It can easily be shown that the derivative of the right
hand side of the inequality with respect to π jtL is positive because
σL + σH > 1.
Thus, for any probability π jtL ≥ 0, Assumption 1 implies that EUitL,sig >
EUitL,nosig. Consequently, a leftist politician outside the presidential office
always prefers the policy implementation in t to be in accordance with
the signal as long as the two possible policies PL and PR do not differ
with respect to any reelection probabilities associated with them. The voter
prefers the informed policy at any rate.
Consider now a rightist individual i outside the presidential office. A
policy decision in line with the president’s signal sjt would lead i to expect
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If, in contrast, the president chooses policy P ∈ {PL, PR} regardless of
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For π jL = 1, this inequality reduces to Assumption 1. The derivative of
the right hand side with respect to π jL is negative. Therefore, Assumption
1 implies the truth of inequality (6) for all π jL ≥ 0. Thus, it follows from
Assumption 1 that EUiR,sig > EU
i
L,nosig for all π
j
L ≥ 0.
Therefore, a policy decision according to the signal in t is always op-
timal from the perspective of a rightist voter, whereas it is optimal in the
eyes of a rightist party member as long as PL and PR do not differ with
respect to reelection probabilities eventually associated with them.
Proof of Lemma 3 Lemma 2 says that the president j who rules
in the second period will decide according to his signal. Let T j denote
the true type of the president and Ti the type of the voter. Besides, let πv
denote the updated probability that the president is of the voter’s type. A
stands for the set of relevant information about j that is accessible to the
voter at the beginning of the second period. Then, the expected utility of
the voter is
EUi (P | A) = 1
2
πv (σHx + σL (1− x)) +
1
2
(1− πv) (σH (1− x) + σLx)
Because EUi (P | A) is increasing in πv, the voter will always vote for
the candidate most likely to be of the same political type.
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose that the incumbent president I al-
ways acts according to his signal. Then, his party can infer the signal from
the policy choice. The leftists have the majority in the party; therefore the
decision is in line with their preferences.
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Suppose that I has implemented PL and that PL has been successful.
Let A represent this information. The updated probability that I is a leftist
is π IL = π
I






L = (1− πC0R ).
If K ∈ {I, N} becomes the incumbent party’s candidate for elections,
the voter will elect him and not C for sure. Accordingly, the expected utility
which any leftist member i of the incumbent party gets from appointing K
as candidate for elections amounts to























πKAL = Pr{TK = L | A} ∈ {π ILSL, πN0L }.
It is easy to see that the right hand side of (18) is increasing in πKAL .
Therefore, K = I is the optimal decision of the party basis.
If I has implemented PL and PL has not been successful, the updated
probability that I is a leftist is π IL = π
I
LUL as defined in (8). The proof that
the optimal decision taken by the incumbent party is K = I is completely
analogously to the one above.
Suppose now, by contrast, that I has implemented PR and that PR has
been successful. Let A′ represent this information. The updated probability
that I is a leftist is π IL = π
I





There are two possible cases:




π ILSR > π
C
L0.
In the case where π ILSR < π
C
L0, the incumbent party knows that if I
became the candidate for elections, the voter would elect C. Therefore, the
expected utility that any leftist member of the incumbent party would get
from the decision K = I is zero.
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By contrast, the expected utility that a leftist member of the incumbent
party would get from the decision K = N amounts to
EUL
(

























Thus, the optimal decision of the party basis is K = N.
In the case where π ILSR > π
C
L0, the incumbent party will become re-
elected regardless of the question whether or not I is appointed again. Let
EUL (K | A′) represent the expected utility that a leftist party member gets
from K ∈ {I, N} ruling in the second period. Besides, let πKA′L = Pr{TK =
L | A′} ∈ { π ILSR, πN0L } represent the conditional probability that K is a left-
ist. It is easy to see that EUL (K | A′) increases in πKA
′
L , so that the optimal
decision is again K = N.
The proof that it will be optimal for the party basis to replace I by N if I
implements PR without success is completely analogous and shall therefore
be skipped here.
This proves part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Now consider the decision situation of a leftist incumbent president,
given the equilibrium behavior of his party basis and the voter, which has
been described above. His expected utility from choosing PL when he has
got a signal sI0 = l̂ amounts to
EU IL
(




σH + (1− σL)
x + E +
1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)]












PL | sI1 = l̂
)
Thus, it is optimal not to deviate.
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If, by contrast, it is a rightist I who has got the signal sI0 = l̂, his ex-
pected payoffs from choosing PL and PR are
EU IR
(




σL + (1− σH)
(1− x) + E + 1
2








σL + (1− σH)
x,
respectively.
Assumption 1 implies that
EU IR
(




PR | sI1 = l̂
)
,
so that it is optimal not to deviate.
If, now, the incumbent politician I is has got a signal sI1 = r̂, his ex-
pected payoffs from implementing PR and PL are
EU IL
(













σL + (1− σH)
x + E +
1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] ,
respectively, if he is a leftist. They are
EU IR
(













σH + (1− σL)
(1− x) + E + 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] ,
respectively, if he is a rightist.
It is optimal not to deviate for any type of incumbent I if and only if
EU IL
(





















σL + (1− σH)
− x− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] = EL.
This proves the part (i) of the Proposition.
Part (iii), namely the claim that this equilibrium is first best, follows
from Assumption 1 and the preferences of the voter, the president, and
the party members. The proof is on the lines of the one for Lemma 2 and
shall therefore be skipped here.
Thus, Proposition 1 has been proved.
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider first part (ii) of Proposition 2 which
characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the party basis. The only differ-
ence to the proof of the second part of Proposition 1 is that the possible
values for the updated probability π IL that I is a leftist change to
π ILSL =
ατ




ατ + (1− α) (1− τ) (1− σH)
,
and
π ILSR = π
I
LUR = 0
In spite of these changes, the proof has exactly the same structure as
the one for part (ii) of Proposition 1 and shall therefore be skipped here.
Consider now part (i) of Proposition 2. The incentives for both types
of president not to deviate when they have got the signal sI0 = l̂ are iden-
tical to the corresponding incentives in the equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 1.
The incentive for the rightist president not to deviate when he has got
the signal sI0 = r̂ implies the following restriction. The rightist president
acts according to the signal sI0 = r̂, if and only if
E < x− (1− σL)
σH + (1− σL)
− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] = EH. (19)
The condition under which the leftist president does not deviate from








PL | sI0 = r̂
)
.
The values of EUL
(




PL | sI0 = r̂
)
are identical to
the ones given in the proof of Proposition 1. Therefore, the above inequal-
ity is equivalent to
E >
σL
σL + (1− σH)
− x− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] = EL. (20)
The two inequalities (19) and (20) prove part (i) of the proposition.
Part (iii) follows from Assumption 1 and the preferences of the voter,
the party members and the politicians. The proof is analogous to the one
for Lemma 1 and can therefore be skipped here.
Proof of Corollary 1 The only other conceivable separating equilib-
ria in pure strategies would be characterized by the following strategies of
the incumbent president:
(i) Any leftist president always chooses PL, whereas any rightist presi-
dent always chooses PR.
(ii) Any leftist president always chooses PR, whereas any rightist presi-
dent always chooses PL.
(iii) The rightist president always acts according to his signal, and the
leftist president always implements PR.
(iv) The leftist president always acts according to his signal, and the
rightist president always implements PR.
(v) The leftist president always acts according to his signal, and the
rightist president always implements PL.
The strategies (i) and (ii) are refuted as equilibrium strategies by se-
quential rationality of the party basis and Assumption 1. Given the behav-
ior described in (i)/(ii), the party basis would re-nominate the incumbent
president after the implementation of PL/PR and replace him by N after
the implementation of PR/PL. But then, Assumption 1 implies that the
rightist/leftist president finds it optimal to deviate and to act according to
his signal.
The strategies described in (iii), by contrast, are excluded from the set
of possible equilibria strategies by Assumption 2. The proof is as follows.
Suppose that a leftist incumbent president has got a signal sI0 = l̂. The









PL | sI0 = l̂
)
which is equivalent to
E > x− 1− σL
σH + (1− σL)
− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] = EH (21)
Suppose now that a rightist incumbent president has got a signal sI0 = l̂.








PL | sI0 = l̂
)
which is equivalent to
E <
σL
σL + (1− σH)
− x− 1
2
[σHx + σL (1− x)] = EL (22)
The two inequalities (10) and (11) together imply that
EL > EH
which is excluded by Assumption 2.
Consider now the strategies described in (iv). If they constituted an
equilibrium, the party basis would re-appoint the incumbent president
after the implementation of PL and replace him after the implementation
of PR, because after the implementation of PL, π IL > π
N0
L , and after the
implementation of PR, π IL < π
N0
L . But then, Assumption 1 implies that the
rightist president will have an incentive to deviate and implement PL if he
gets a signal sI0 = l̂. Thus, the strategies described in (iv) do not constitute
an equilibrium.
Finally, consider the strategies that are given in (v). Here, the party
basis would re-appoint the incumbent president after the implementation
of PR and replace him after the implementation of PL, because after the
implementation of PR, π IL > π
N0
L , whereas after the implementation of PL,
π IL < π
N0
L . But then, Assumption 1 implies that the rightist president has
an incentive to deviate and implement PR if he gets a signal sI0 = r̂. Thus,
the strategies described in (iv) do not constitute an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3 Given that both types of president always
implement PL, neither the party basis nor the voter can update beliefs




always. The party basis is indifferent between I and N, and I becomes the
candidate for elections. Because π I0L > π
C0
L , the voter always elects I.
Assumption 1 is compatible with the equilibrium behavior of the pres-
ident only if after the implementation of PR, he would loose his office.
Replacing the president is optimal for the leftist party members only if af-
ter having observed PR, they would believe that the president’s probability
of being a leftist is smaller than πN0L .
Define this off-equilibrium belief as
Pr{T I = L | P = PR} ≡ π Io f f 1L < π
N0
L .
I first prove that given the beliefs and the strategy of the party basis and
the voter, it is optimal for any incumbent president to always implement
PL, if and only if E > EH.
Suppose that the incumbent president has got the signal sI0 = l̂. Then,
Assumption 1 implies that he prefers implementing PL over implementing
PR. Thus, it remains to be proved that even after having received the signal
sI0 = r̂, it is optimal for any type of president to keep at PL.


















PL | sI0 = r̂
)
. (24)
The second inequality implies the first one and is therefore more re-
strictive. It is easy to see that (24) is equivalent to
E > EH.
Thus, the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 exists. The ineffi-
ciency of the equilibrium follows again from Assumption 1 and the pref-
erences of the voter, the politicians and the party members.
This proves Proposition 3.
The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3 is admissible if and only
if the off-equilibrium belief π Io f f 1L cannot be eliminated by a deviation-
rationalization. It is easy to see that a true and convincing deviation-ratio-
nalization does not exist. The definition of deviation-rationalization-proof-
ness is given in line with the proof of Corollary 3.
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Proof of Corollary 3 First, I define deviation-rationalization-proof-
ness.
Deviation-rationalization-proofness
Consider a signalling game of the following structure. Nature draws a
random variable ỹ ∼ F (ỹ). Besides, nature draws a type t̃ from a finite set
T for the Sender SE, and a type h̃ from a finite set H for SE. The type t̃ is




; and type h̃ is drawn according









on t. SE learns the realizations t and h, updates his beliefs πSE according
to Bayes rule wherever possible and sends a message mSE ∈ MSE to the
Receiver RE. MSE is the finite message space of SE. RE observes mSE,
updates his beliefs πRE according to Bayes rule wherever possible and
takes an action aRE ∈ ARE, where A is finite.
Let C∗ denote the equilibrium path expected to be taken in the continu-
ation game. Besides, let m∗SE denote the equilibrium message of SE and a
∗
RE
the equilibrium action of RE. Then, the (expected) equilibrium payoffs of
SE and RE are EUSE (ỹ, m∗SE, t, a
∗
RE, C
∗) and EURE (ỹ, m∗SE, C
∗), respectively.
Let {MPBSE , APBRE, ΠPBSE , ΠPBRE, CPB} denote the set of strategies and beliefs
sustaining the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. A perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of such a signalling game is reasonable if and only if it is
deviation-rationalization-proof. The equilibrium will be broken by a mes-
sage m′SE ∈ M, m′SE 6= m∗SE if and only if there is a true and credible
deviation-rationalization d ∈ D that SE could send to RE after defection.
D is infinite and contains all possible and arbitrarily long utterances in or-
dinary languages shared by SE and RE that have a focal meaning eligible
for deviation-rationalization. A deviation-rationalization d can be defined
as follows.
Let aRE (mSE, πRE) denote the optimal response aRE of RE to the mes-
sage mSE, given the corresponding beliefs πRE of RE.







has been taken, where πm
′
SE,PB
RE represents the equilib-
rium-sustaining beliefs of RE after observation of m′SE. Besides, let π
m′SE,d
RE
denote the beliefs that RE will rationally form if he observes m′SE and





ỹ, m∗SE, t, a
∗
RE, C





ỹ, m′SE, t, a
∗
RE, C





ỹ, m∗SE, t, a
∗
RE, C





ỹ, m′SE, t, a
∗
RE, C
∗ | h 6= h′
)
,
EUSE (ỹ, m∗SE, t, a
∗
RE, C
∗ | h ∈ H) (27)
> EUSE
(



















then m′SE breaks the equilibrium if and only if there exists some unex-
pected speech d ∈ D asserting
(i) that (25), (26), (27) and (28) are true,
(ii) that therefore RE should rationally believe SE to be of type h′,
(iii) that π′RE = Pr{t = t′ | h = h′}, and





RE and choose action
a∗RE.
Such a speech d is self-enforcing. The Sender SE will want to make
it only if it is true. Therefore, it is utterly convincing and rationalizes the
deviation from equilibrium.
Application to the model In the present setting, y is the state of
the world w, t is the political type of the president, and h is the signal he
has got. The deviation m′SE would consist in choosing to act according to
the signal. The equilibrium message m∗SE would be the manifesto-driven
policy on which there is pooling in the supposed equilibrium. The action









replacement of the president by a newcomer.
The equilibrium with pooling on PR that has been described in Corol-
lary 2 is sustained by the off-equilibrium belief of the leftist members of
the incumbent party that
Pr{T I = L | P = PL} ≡ π Io f f 1L < π
N
L0.
But the belief π Io f f 1L < π
N0
L and therefore the equilibrium under consid-
eration is not deviation-rationalization-proof. In order to see this, consider
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the following deviation-rationalization uttered by a president after the im-
plementation of PL:
”I deviated from the equilibrium in choosing action PL, as you can see.
Deviating is optimal for me if and only if
(i) I can convince you that my conditional probability of being a leftist
did not decrease after deviation. Then, it will be optimal for you to appoint
me as candidate for elections.
(ii) I got a signal sI0 = l̂.
I tell you two things. Firstly, I indeed got a signal sI0 = l̂. Secondly, the
signal sI0 = l̂ is received with higher probability by a leftist politician than
by a rightist one. Consequently, the conditional probability that I am a
leftist, given that my deviation was rational, did increase and not decrease.
Therefore, you should not replace me.”
This speech is true and convincing; and therefore the pooling equilib-
rium where both types of president always implement PR is not deviation-
rationalization-proof.
That, by contrast, the other two pooling equilibria described in Propo-
sitions 1 and 3 are deviation-rationalization-proof can be seen easily from
the impossibility of formulating a speech along the same lines as the one
above that would rationalize a deviation from them. If one did, this speech
would not be true or would not rationalize a deviation from these equilib-
ria.
This proves Corollary 3.
Because the proofs of Propositions 4–7 are similar in spirit to the
proofs already provided for Propositions 1–2, I will only sketch the logic
of these proofs. The detailed calculations can be obtained on request by
the author.
Proof of Proposition 4 Define Pr{TC = R | P = PL ∧ w = r} ≡
πCRUL, Pr{TC = R | P = PL ∧ w = l} ≡ πCRSL, Pr{TC = R | P = PR ∧ w =
l} ≡ πCRUR and Pr{TC = R | P = PR ∧ w = r} ≡ πCRSR. Suppose the
president to act according to his signal. Then, calculating these probabili-






RSR > (1− π I0L ). It
follows from the second inequality that C will not be reelected after the
implementation of PR.
Thus, the voter behaves as described in Proposition 4 if and only if
πCRUL < (1− π I0L ) < πCRSL. Given the supposed behavior of the president,





Calculating and comparing the expected utilities from informed policy
and populist implementation of PL for both political types of president,
it can be shown easily that C acts according to his signal if and only if
E < min{ECL(a)L , E
CR(a)
L }.
Proof of Proposition 5 Suppose the president to act according to
his signal. Because πCRUR > π
C
RSR > (1 − π I0L ), C will not be reelected
after the implementation of PR. Thus, the voter behaves as described in
Proposition 4 if and only if πCRUL < π
C
RSL < (1 − π I0L ). The first part of
this inequality is easily shown to hold in general, given the behavior of




Calculating and comparing the expected utilities from informed policy
and populist implementation of PL for both political types of president,
it can be shown easily that C acts according to his signal if and only if
E < min{ECL(b)L , E
CR(b)
L }.
This proves Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6 Suppose C to act according to his signal
if he is a rightist and to implement PL regardless of his signal if he is a
leftist. Then, the voter behaves as described in Proposition 6 if and only
if πCRUL < (1 − π I0L ) < πCRSL. Given the behavior of the president, this




Calculating and comparing the expected utilities from informed policy
and populist implementation of PL for both political types of president,
it can be shown easily that given Assumption 3, C acts as described in
Proposition 6 if and only if ECL(a)L < E < E
CR(a)
L .
Proof of Proposition 7 Suppose C to act according to his signal
if he is a rightist and to implement PL regardless of his signal if he is a
leftist. Then, the voter behaves as described in Proposition 7 if and only if
πCRUL < π
C
RSL < (1− π I0L ). Given the behavior of the president, the first





Calculating and comparing the expected utilities from informed policy
and populist implementation of PL for both political types of president,
it can be shown easily that given Assumption 3, C acts as described in
Proposition 7 if and only if ECL(b)L < E < E
CR(b)
L .
Proof of Proposition 8 Consider first a rightist voter confronted
by the leftist incumbent party. If and only if the incumbent party will be
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relegated regardless of the president’s policy choice, it is optimal for both
types of president and for all values of e and E to always act according to
their signal in the first period.
It is easy to see that the voter will elect the challenger C independently
of the policy implemented in the first period if and only if I can be deemed
more likely to be a leftist than C even after having implemented an unsuc-
cessful right wing policy. This condition is equivalent to
ατ (1− σH)
ατ (1− σH) + (1− α) (1− τ) (1− σL)
>
α (1− τ)
α (1− τ) + (1− α) τ







If and only if this condition is fulfilled, the incumbent president always
acts according to his signal, independently of the value of E.
Consider now a leftist voter confronted by the rightist party that has
become the incumbent party. If and only if the rightist party will be rel-
egated regardless of the president’s policy choice, it is optimal for both
types of president and for all values of e and E to always act according to
their signal in the first period.
It is easy to see that the voter will elect the challenger I independently
of the policy implemented in the first period if and only if C can be deemed
more likely to be a rightist than I even after having implemented an un-
successful left wing policy. Formally, this condition says that
(1− α) τ (1− σH)
(1− α) τ (1− σH) + α (1− τ) (1− σL)
>
(1− α) (1− τ)
ατ + (1− α) (1− τ) .







Proof of Proposition 9 It is easy to see that the second-period util-
ity expected by the voter at the beginning of the first period does not
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depend on what happens in the first period. Therefore, only first-period
utilities must be compared across equilibria.
Consider first the case where EL < E < EH. If the voter elected the
leftist party for incumbent, the inefficient separating equilibrium described
in Proposition 2 would be played. Her expected first-period utility from
































If, however, the voter elects the rightist party for incumbent, her ex-
pected first-period utility from the resulting efficient equilibrium described



































Define 4EUdhsep ≡ EUdisheffL − EU
hsep
L . The voter will decide for the
efficient equilibrium under political disharmonism if and only if
4EUdhsep > 0.
Calculating 4EUdhsep, substituting the right hand sides of (1) and (2)
for π I0L and π
C0
R in the above inequality, and simplifying with the help of
simple algebra, one finds that
4EUdhsep > 0
if and only if
1
2
α (1− α) τ2[σLx− x + σH (1− x)] (29)
+α2τ (1− τ) [σHx− x + σL (1− x)]
+α (1− α) (1− τ)2 [(σH − σL) (2x− 1)]
> 0.
It is straightforward to see that the third term in brackets in (29)
is strictly positive. If [σLx − x + σH (1− x)] > 0, then also
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[σHx− x + σL (1− x)] > 0. It is easy to see that [σLx− x + σH (1− x)] > 0
if and only if x1−x <
σH
1−σL . The latter inequality has been assumed to hold
true in Assumption 1.
Thus, all the terms in brackets in (29) are strictly positive; and (29)
holds true. Accordingly, 4EUdhsep > 0. The leftist voter elects the rightist
party for incumbent whenever EL < E < EH.
It remains to show that for E > EH, the leftist voter also prefers to
elect the rightist party. It is easy to see that the first-period utility the voter
would expect from the inefficient pooling equilibrium described in Propo-
sition 3 is less than EUhsepL . But if she elected the leftist party for incumbent
and E > EH, this inefficient pooling equilibrium would be played. There-
fore, and because EUhsepL < EU
disheff
L as demonstrated above, the voter
elects the rightist party for incumbent whenever E > EH.
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